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Employer's Duty to Know Deficiencies
of Employees
Martin R. Loftus*
N THE CASE OF Kendall v. Gore Properties Inc.' an employer
was held liable for the willful and malicious (criminal) acts
of his employee. The employee, a janitor in an apartment house,
had murdered a tenant. The employer was held liable on the
ground that he, the landlord, had been recklessly ignorant in the
selection of the employee. The case illustrates the modern doc-
trine of allocating to the employer liability for the harm caused
by the servant's tortious behavior, based on his negligent selec-
tion of the employee, even though the criminal nature of the
servant's act is far beyond that which might reasonably be fore-
seen and seems to be clearly beyond the "course and scope of the
employment." It also poses a question regarding to what lengths
an employer must go in ascertaining the deficiencies of his em-
ployees.
Another theory which held an employer vicariously liable
for the losses caused by torts of his servants had its basis in the
idea that the employer was the one who ought to bear and dis-
tribute the loss.2 In support of this theory, it was also reasoned
that an employer who was held strictly liable for the conduct of
his employees would be stimulated to use great care in the selec-
tion and supervision of his employees. 3 Thus his duty to know
their deficiencies has several bases.
Employer's Duty At Common Law
At common law certain classes of employers had to use
greater care than others in ascertaining their employees' de-
ficiencies, and even though they exercised such care, they have
been held to be vicariously liable for their employees' intentional
torts. Thus in the case of carriers,4 innkeepers,5 and hospitals,6
* B.S., Niagara Univ.; Major, U. S. Army; until 1966, Asst. Prof. of Mili-
tary Science, John Carroll Univ.; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College, on leave of absence,
presently on active duty at Fort Eustis, Va.
1 236 F. 2d 673 (D. C. Cir. 1956); 45 Georgetown L. J. 310 (Winter '56-57).
2 Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 Yale L. J. 105 (1916); Douglas,
Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L. J. 584, 720 (1929);
Miller, The Master-Servant Concept and Judge-Made Law, 1 Loyola L.
Rev. 25 (1941); Ferson, Bases for Master's Liability and for Principal's
Liability to Third Persons, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 260 (1951), cited in Prosser, Law
of Torts, 471 (3d ed. 1964).
3 Mechem, Outline of the Law of Agency § 214 (4th ed. 1952).
4 Southern Ry. v. Beaty, 212 Ala. 608, 103 So. 658 (1925); Korner v. Cos-
grove, 108 Ohio St. 484, 141 N.E. 267, 31 A. L. R. 1193 (1923).
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employers have been held liable for their servants' personal
attacks when the attacks are made on the employer's premises.
The employer's liability was based upon the fiduciary relation
which existed between the employer and passengers, guests, or
patients.7
In the absence of a duty relation which requires a very
high degree of care in the selection of employees8 it seems clear
that an employer who has used ordinary care in selecting or
retaining an employee who subsequently commits an intentional
tort, may still be held liable on the theory that the employee's
conduct was reasonably connected with his employer's busi-
ness,9 and it is therefore within the scope of his employment. 10
However, in the absence of a duty relation requiring the em-
ployer to use a high degree of care in ascertaining his employee's
deficiencies, he was not held liable for the willful and malicious
torts of his employees. Thus, in Park Transfer Co. v. Lumber-
mens Mut. Casualty Co." where an employee assaulted and
killed the plaintiff's insured, the court said:
Unless an assault, or other tort, is activated in part at least
by a purpose to serve a principal, the principal is not liable.
A third situation exists where an employee's conduct is
not so malicious or willful as to constitute a departure from
the scope of his employment, 12 and thus the employer will not be
liable, unless there is evidence to show that the employee was
so careless that his employer ought to have foreseen the danger to
his customers as a result of his characteristics. 3
The employer may however, still be held liable if there
is evidence to show he failed to use ordinary care in the selec-
tion 14 or retention 15 of such an employee. An employer must
5 Beilke v. Carroll, 51 Wash. 395, 98 P. 1119 (1909); Clancy v. Barker, 71
Neb. 83, 98 N.W. 440 (1904).
6 Vannah v. Hart Private Hospital, 228 Mass. 132, 117 N.E. 328 (1917).
7 Prosser, op. cit. supra, n. 2 at 477.
8 Such as that owed by innkeepers to their guests-see: Mayo Hotel Co. v.
Danciger, 143 Okla. 196, 288 P. 309 (1930).
9 Palmeri v. Manhattan Ry., 133 N. Y. 261, 30 N. E. 1001 (1892); Johnson
v. Monson, 183 Cal. 149, 190 P. 635 (1920); Rice v. Marler, 107 Colo. 57, 108
P. 2d 868 (1940).
10 Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," Harvard Legal Essays,
433, 453 (1934); Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 348 (1932); cited in Prosser, op. cit.
supra n. 2 at 476.
11 79 App. D. C. 48, 142 F. 2d 100 (1944); see Grimes v. B. F. Saul Co., 60
App. D. C. 47, 47 F. 2d 409 (1931).
12 Creamer v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., 260 Ky. 544, 86 S.W. 2d 288
(1935).
13 Priest v. F. W. Woolworth Five and Ten Cent Store, 228 Mo. App. 23, 62
S.W. 2d 926 (1933).
14 Kiser v. Skelly Oil Co., 136 Kan. 812, 18 P. 2d 181 (1933).




reasonably ascertain if an independent contractor possesses the
necessary skill and is suited for the type of work to be per-
formed, 16 and is competent and careful.17 If it can be shown
that the employer was not negligent in the selection of the inde-
pendent contractor, the employer will not be held liable for the
contractor's negligence.' 8
If an agency relation exists and the principal does not ex-
ercise due care in the selection of his agent, thereby employ-
ing a vicious person to perform duties which will bring him
into contact with others while in the performance of his duties,
the principal will be liable for harm which may occur because
of the agent's vicious propensities. 19
At common law the employer had a duty to select suitable
and competent employees 20 possessing the mental, moral and
physical qualifications to enable them to perform their duties
without endangering fellow employees. 21 The duty of the em-
ployer to know his employee's deficiencies in regard to the
fellow servant doctrine was stated in Country Club of Jackson
v. Turner,22 where the court said:
Compliance with the duty to use reasonable care to main-
tain working conditions that are reasonably safe involves
the duty to use such care in avoiding the employment or
retention of a servant who is known to be dangerous or
vicious where such propensities are calculated to expose
co-employees to greater dangers than the work necessarily
entails. This principle no longer needs cited authority.
Until recently the most common theory for proceeding
against an employer who knew his employee was a dangerous
person was the doctrine of respondeat superior.2" This doctrine
bases on the ideas of "ability to spread the cost" and the social
value of requiring supervision of employees. 24 The more recent
cases ignore the doctrine of respondeat superior and proceed on
the theory that where the employer is negligent in hiring and
retaining an employee with known deficiencies and in permitting
such an employee to engage in the master's business, the em-
ployer's liability results from his negligence in selection and
16 Connors v. Hennessey, 112 Mass. 96 (1873).
I7 Ozan Lumber Co. v. McNeely, 214 Ark. 657, 217 S.W. 2d 341 (1949); 8
A. L. R. 2d 261 (1949).
18 Parker v. Taylor, 295 Mass. 51, 3 N.E. 2d 25 (1936); Rasimas v. Swan, 320
Mass. 60, 67 N.E. 2d 662 (1946).
19 Restatement, Agency § 213 pp. 465-466 (1933).
20 Wyman v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 158 F. 957 (2d Cir. 1908).
21 McCarty v. Mitchell, 169 Miss. 82, 151 So. 567 (1934).
22 192 Miss. 510, 4 So. 2d 718, 719 (1941).
23 Hall v. Smathers, 240 N. Y. 486, 148 N.E. 654 (1925).
24 See, 1 Encyc. of Negligence § 232 (1962).
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retention of such an employee.25 Thus, in Fleming v. Bronfin,
the employer was held liable for the negligent selection and re-
tention of a grocery deliveryman who criminally assaulted a
housewife in her home while delivering groceries. 26 If an un-
reliable employee departs from the scope of his employment and
his employer should have foreseen such a departure, the em-
ployer will be liable for the employee's torts committed during
that departure. 27
Evidence Required To Show Employer's Common Law Duty
The common law duty of an employer toward third persons
and the consequent liability in cases of breach of this duty
seem to be clear and well recognized. The question remains as
to whether or not the investigation by the employer was ade-
quate to relieve him of liability for his employee's conduct.28
If the plaintiff can prove that the employer knew or should
have known about the bad proclivities of an employee, the
employer may be held liable for the selection or retention of
such incompetent employee. 29
A general question asked of an employer as to whether or
not he had knowledge or belief of his employee's incompetence
was held to be not admissible in showing the employer's neg-
ligent retention of an employee. 30 Nor is the fact that a work-
man has been given derogatory nicknames sufficient to show his
employer's knowledge of incompetency. 31 Competent and rele-
vant evidence of a prior suit against a defendant, showing that a
physician employed by him was lacking in skill, has been held
admissible to show that the defendant was negligent in retaining
the physician as his employee.3 2 Similarly it has been held that
where there is competent and relevant evidence of an em-
ployer's knowledge of an employee's recklessness, it is admis-
sible to show that the employer was negligent in his retention
of the employee.3 3 As tending to show the employer's knowl-
edge of his employee's conduct, prior acts of insubordination
and willful disobedience may be shown.34
25 Murray v. Modoc State Bank, 181 Kan. 642, 313 P. 2d 304 (1957).
26 80 A. 2d 915 (D. C. Munic. Ct. App. 1951).
27 Boland v. Love, 222 F. 2d 27 (D. C. Cir. 1955).
28 Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 46 N.W. 2d 382 (1951).
29 Statham v. Blaine, 234 Miss. 649, 107 So. 2d 93 (1958).
30 Pfudl v. F. J. Romer Sons, 107 Minn. 353, 120 N.W. 302, at 303 (1909).
31 St. Louis A. & T. H. R.R. v. Corgan, 49 Ill. App. 229 (1891).
32 McMahan v. Carolina Spruce Co., 180 N. C. 636, 105 S.E. 439 (1920).
33 D. H. Dalton Const. Co. v. Huskey, 186 Ark. 934, 56 S.W. 2d 1018 (1933);
Weddle v. Loges, 52 Cal. App. 2d 115, 125 P. 2d 914 (1942).
34 Robbins v. Lewiston, A. & W. St. Ry., 107 Me. 42, 77 A. 537 (1910); Mont-




Evidence may be admitted to show that an employer has
selected or retained an employee who was habitually careless, 35
forgetful,36 intoxicated, 37 inattentive,3" reckless 39 and malicious 40
either before or after he employed him; 41 and he would there-
fore be liable for injuries which the employee might cause.
However, if it can be shown that the employer took all reason-
able precautions, no liability will result.4 2
If the plaintiff can show that the employer did not investi-
gate, or investigated the employee's background inadequately,
it provides good evidence for the jury on the issue of negligence
and also shows a causal connection between the defendant's con-
duct and the harm. But if his proof does not show that a
reasonable investigation would have given notice of the danger,
he has failed to demonstrate clearly that there is a causal con-
nection between the employer's negligence and the harm.43
A recent case illustrates that an employer need not exercise
great diligence in investigating his employees. In Lee v.
Swan44 an automobile owner, who knew that his employee had
drinking and domestic problems and had lost his previous
job, was held not liable for injuries caused to a third party.
The employer had asked the employee if he had a chauffeur's
license and had received an affirmative reply. The employer
did not check official sources. He was not liable because the
plaintiff could not prove circumstances that would show that
the employer's denial of knowledge of his employee's incom-
petency was untrue.
Statutory Duty To Know Employee's Deficiencies
Most states have adopted workmen's compensation laws
which are based upon strict liability of the employer for the
35 Houston & T. C. Ry. v. Patton, 9 S. W. 175 (Tex. 1888); Johansen v. Pio-
neer Min. Co., 77 Wash. 421, 137 P. 1019 (1914).
36 Ledwidge v. Hathaway, 170 Mass. 348, 49 N.E. 656 (1898).
37 Layzell v. J. H. Sommers Coal Co., 156 Mich. 268, 117 N.W. 179 (1908),
adhered to on rehearing, 156 Mich. 268, 120 N.W. 996 (1909).
38 Yazoo & M. V. Ry. v. Hare, 104 Miss. 564, 61 So. 648 (1913); Walters v.
Durham Lumber Co., 163 N. C. 536, 80 S.E. 49 (1913).
39 Rosenstiel v. Pittsburgh Ry., 230 Pa. 273, 79 A. 556 (1911); Serdan v.
Falk Co., 153 Wis. 169, 140 N.W. 1035 (1913).
40 Svacek v. Shelley, 359 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1961); Kelly v. Oregon Ship-
building Corp., 183 Or. 1, 189 P.2d 105 (1948).
41 Furlong v. New York, N. H. & H. Ry., 83 Conn. 568, 78 A. 489 (1910);
Brown v. Levy, 108 Ky. 165, 55 S.W. 1079 (1900); Norfolk & W. Ry. v.
Hoover, 79 Md. 253, 29 A. 994 (1894).
42 The Elton, 142 F. 367 (3rd Cir. 1906); Roblin v. Kansas City St. J. & C. B.
Ry., 119 Mo. 467, 24 S.W. 1011 (1894); Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 46
N.W. 2d 382 (1951) (Investigation held adequate as a matter of law).
43 Schulz v. Pennsylvania R.R., 350 U. S. 523 (1956).
44 111 Ga. App. 88, 140 S.E. 2d 562 (1965).
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risks of the employment. 45 There are many injuries which are
still not covered by these acts, and most of the statutes are
limited to injuries which occur because of and in the course
of employment. In many instances, however, recovery is al-
lowed for injuries sustained through conduct which is inde-
pendent of and unconnected with the employment because the
employer was negligent in allowing such conduct to continue.46
Liability under workmen's compensation acts is not based on
negligence of the employer in failing to stop such conduct. His
knowledge is material only as to whether the injury arose out
of the course of employment. If the employer could reasonably
expect, with.his knowledge of the situation, that injury might
occur from the conduct, such conduct is deemed to have arisen
out of the employment. 47
Proof of custom or accepted conduct of the employee is es-
sential in allowing recovery. 48 Actual or constructive knowledge
of the deficient conduct has been deemed sufficient to allow re-
covery. 49 In Industrial Com'r. v. McCarthy,50 a New York court
allowed a recovery of double the normal amount awarded for
death benefits because the employer had permitted the under-
age employee to labor in violation of the statute. Recent au-
thority indicates that recovery is allowed without knowledge
being a prerequisite.5
1
Cases under the Federal Employer's Liability Act 52 have
rejected the duty of an employer to provide safe employees on
the ground that the employer's duty is fulfilled by hiring em-
ployees who are capable of doing the specific work for which
they were hired.53 Thus, in Young v. New York Central Rail-
road Co.,54 an employer was held not liable for an assault by
one of its employees upon another, even though the employer
knew of previous assaults committed by the same employee.
45 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 555.
46 Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. v. Burns, 290 S.W. 2d 836 (Ky. 1956). See
annot., 159 A. L. R. 319 at 337 (1945); Larson, Workmen's Compensation
Law, §§ 23-41 (1965).
47 Socha v. Cudahy Packing Co., 105 Neb. 691, 181 N.W. 706 (1921); 58 Am.
Jur., Workmen's Compensation Sec. 268 (1948).
48 Ognibene v. Rochester Mfg. Co., 298 N. Y. 85, 80 N.E. 2d 749 (1948) (dis-
senting opinion).
49 Lang v. Franklin Ry. Supply Co., 272 App. Div. 988, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 1
(1947).
50 295 N. Y. 443, 68 N.E.2d 434 (1946).
51 Piatek v. Plymouth Rock Provision Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 405, 224 N. Y. S.
2d 634 (1962).
52 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. A. sec. 51 (1954).
53 Roebuck v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 99 Kan. 544, 162 P. 1153 (1917);
Hines v. Cole, 123 Miss. 254, 85 So. 199 (1920).





The leading case 5 denying recovery under the F.E.L.A. for the
employer's negligent employment of a dangerous employee, has
undoubtedly been modified by the statutory amendment5 6 to
the F.E.L.A., which abolished the doctrine of "Assumed Risk,"
thereby shifting the risk from the employee to the employer.
A relatively recent case confirms the employer's liability
where he was negligent in retaining an employee with known
dangerous proclivities which resulted in injuries to a fellow em-
ployee.5 7 The Jones Act5 s extends the provisions of the F.E.L.A.
to injured seamen on the basis of an employer's negligent hiring
of a vicious assailant.5 9
Conclusion
Modern social and economic forces continue to exert pres-
sure on the remaining common law defenses of the employer.
Recent cases involving tortious conduct of employees, whether
decided at common law or on statute, indicate that an employer
will be charged with liability for the willful torts of his employees
on the basis of his negligence in ascertaining those deficiencies
which should have led him to foresee the possibility of tortious
conduct.
55 Davis v. Green, 260 U. S. 349 (1922).
56 53 Stat. 1404 (1939); 45 U. S. C. A., sec. 54 (1954).
57 Tatham v. Wabash Ry., 412 I1. 568, 107 N.E.2d 735 (1952).
58 Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920); 46 U. S. C. A. sec. 688 (1958).
59 Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1945); Koehler v. Presque-
Isle Transp. Co., 141 F. 2d 490 (2d Cir. 1944).
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